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I. INTRODUCTION 
Stories of Cuban athletes leaving the communist isle for the 
capitalist pastures of the United States read like a movie script. World-
class Cuban baseball players, in pursuit of a better life, have allegedly 
been “kidnapped, held hostage, forced to sign binding documents at 
gun- and knifepoint, threatened with mutilation and terrorized by those 
from some of the world’s most murderous gangs.”1 But this is no 
 
1. See Jeff Passan, 10 Degrees: Cuban Trafficking Grows into MLB’s Ugly Secret, 
YAHOO! SPORTS (Apr. 20, 2014, 11:47 PM), https://sports.yahoo.com/news/10-degrees—
cuban-trafficking-grows-into-mlb-s-ugly-secret-034704407.html [https://perma.cc/G3TY-
G4MT]. 
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movie;  every day, Cuban baseball players are sacrificing their lives by 
traveling to the United States in order to achieve their dream of 
securing a contract from one of thirty Major League Baseball (“MLB”) 
organizations. 
US economic sanctions and MLB’s implementation of prohibitive 
rules against Cuba have significantly limited the paths by which Cuban 
citizens can legally and safely come to the United States to play 
baseball.2 Generally, Cuban baseball players have been forced to 
escape Cuba under false auspices, clandestinely travel to a third 
country, and hastily obtain questionably legal residency there prior to 
signing a lucrative contract with an MLB club.3 Unsurprisingly, this 
dangerous process known as defection often involves corrupt human 
trafficking and a multitude of international financial crimes by the 
players, their representatives, MLB teams, and even MLB itself.4 
This defection process was the status quo until December 19, 
2018, when MLB and the Cuban Baseball Federation (FCB) entered 
into an agreement (2018 MLB-FCB Agreement) that would 
purportedly bring an end to defection, the human trafficking of Cuban 
baseball players, and the international financial criminal violations 
inherent in the process.5 The 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement, which 
President Barack Obama’s Treasury Department made possible 
through the granting of a general license,6 and a policy interpretation 
 
2. See Rachel D. Solomon, Cuban Baseball Players, The Unlucky Ones: United States-
Cuban Professional Baseball Relations Should be an Integral Part of the United States-Cuban 
Relationship, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 153, 156-58 (2011) (discussing the economic restrictions on 
the freedom of Cuban baseball players and MLB’s eligibility rules).  
3. Id. at 157. 
4. See, e.g., Dara Lind, Major League Baseball’s Human Trafficking Problem, VOX 
(Sept. 15, 2014, 11:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2014/9/15/6147663/baseball-players-
trafficking-cuba-puig-cartels-smuggling [https://perma.cc/72PG-3SPR]; Jeff Passan, Sources: A 
Federal Grand Jury is Investigating MLB’s International Dealings, and Officials on all Sides 
Are Worried, YAHOO! SPORTS (Sept. 28, 2018, 1:58 AM), https://sports.yahoo.com/sources-
federal-grand-jury-investigating-mlbs-international-dealings-officials-sides-worried-
055827471.html [https://perma.cc/LTB8-Q9TB]. 
5. MLB, MLBPA Reach Deal with Cuban Federation, MLB NEWS (Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://www.mlb.com/news/mlb-announces-deal-with-cuban-federation-c302036110 
[https://perma.cc/Y63Z-XWS5] [hereinafter MLB Announcement]. 
6. Mark Townsend, OFAC Confirms Stance on Unblocking Cuban Baseball Players, 
YAHOO! SPORTS (Jan. 31, 2015, 2:27 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/mlb-big-league-
stew/ofac-reaches-out-to-yoan-moncada—othercuban-stars-062132165.html 
[https://perma.cc/VR8E-S7F2]. 
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that concluded FCB was not a branch of the Cuban government,7 
allowed MLB clubs to safely and legally sign players directly from 
Cuba.8 As part of this agreement, a percentage of that player’s salary 
would be funneled into the FCB for the purpose of improving the 
baseball infrastructure in Cuba.9 
This historic agreement was short-lived. On April 8, 2019 the 
Trump Administration moved to strictly reinforce the Cuban embargo 
in an attempt to “expose the crimes of the Castro regime,” and force 
democratic change upon a Cuban government which “spread violence 
and instability in the region.”10 This strict reinforcement included a 
complete cancellation of the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement.11 In an 
abrupt reversal, the Trump Administration’s Treasury Department 
determined that the FCB was in fact a branch of the Cuban government, 
and thus any payment remitted to it through MLB contracts was strictly 
prohibited under existing sanctions against the communist state.12 
Further, any contract with Cuban defectors would now only be 
approved through a more restrictive specific license, effectively 
destroying the 2018 MLB-FCB agreement.13 
This Note will explore whether the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement 
or the Trump Administration’s cancellation of said agreement is more 
in line with the objectives of the United States’ sanctions against Cuba. 
Part II will examine the history of economic sanctions against Cuba 
through present day. Part III will analyze the exceptions to those 
sanctions, and the US Treasury’s role in granting licenses that 
circumvent the prohibitive sanctions. Part IV will discuss MLB’s role 
in adhering to the economic sanctions against Cuba. Part V will 
 
7. MLB Announcement, supra note 5. 
8. Id. 
9. Id.; Andrew Zimbalist, Trump Administration’s Nixing of MLB Player Transfer Deal 
with Cuba is Bad Policy, FORBES (Apr. 11, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewzimbalist/2019/04/11/trump-mlb-cuba/#1b11094a5b19 
[https://perma.cc/CQ9S-3BUX]. 
10. Dan Merica, Trump Unveils New Restrictions on Travel, Business with Cuba, CNN 
(June 17, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www-m.cnn.com/2017/06/16/politics/trump-cuba-
policy/index.html?r=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F [https://perma.cc/6L4C-S855]; 
Zimbalist, supra note 9.  
11. Jared Diamond & Vivian Salama, Trump Administration Blocks Baseball Players 
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examine the terms of the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement and delineate the 
arguments by the MLB in favor of the agreement, and by the Trump 
Administration opposing the agreement. Part VI will present a forward-
looking analysis, including reasonable solutions on how MLB and the 
Trump Administration can curb human trafficking and end the crimes 
inherent in the defection process, while still complying with the strictly 
enforced embargo. 
II. EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA: 
NATIONAL SECURITY OR POLITICAL RETRIBUTION? 
In order to best understand the two sides of the 2018 MLB-FCB 
Agreement, it is crucial to examine the history of sanctions that have 
hamstrung United States and Cuba relations. The initial authority for 
the United States’ embargo against Cuba originates from the 1917 
Trading with the Enemy Act (“TWEA”), which bans transfers of 
property between US citizens and enemy nations, unless authorized by 
the President.14 The TWEA maintains that, during wartime, the 
President may: 
[I]nvestigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or 
prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, 
withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or 
dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect 
to, or transaction involving, any property in which any foreign 
country or a national thereof has any interest, by any person, or 
with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States.15 
In other words, the TWEA vests the executive with the authority 
to place economic embargos on enemy nations.16 In 1933, Congress 
extended TWEA past its wartime application, to include circumstances 
of “existing national emergency.”17 The definition of “existing national 
emergency” has been widely interpreted to vest the President with the 
power to enforce embargos upon foreign countries irrespective of a 
 
14. Trading with the Enemy Act, 12 U.S.C. §95a (2010). 
15. Id. at §95a(1)(B). 
16. See Scott M. Cwiertney, The Need for a Worldwide Draft: Major League Baseball and 
Its Relationship with the Cuban Embargo and United States Foreign Policy, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. 
L. REV. 391, 395-97 (2000). 
17. See id. at 396 (discussing 40 Stat. 966, March 9, 1933, ch 1, Title I, § 2). 
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declaration of war, and without even a declarative or specific national 
crisis.18 
Under the aforementioned TWEA authority, Congress codified 
the thrust of the Cuban Embargo in 1963 with the enactment of the 
Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR).  The CACR prohibits 
“transactions incident to travel to, from, and within Cuba” and, most 
importantly, “payment or transfer” of funds to Cuban Nationals.19 
Before the Communist Cuban Revolution of 1959, the major impetus 
for these sanctions, over one hundred Cuban nationals played Major 
League Baseball in the United States and could freely sign with any 
MLB club.20 The CACR banned MLB clubs from performing any 
business in Cuba, including scouting or signing players.21 The United 
States may criminally prosecute anyone who violates the TWEA or the 
CACR.22 
National security was the initial justification for the embargo.23 In 
his proclamation announcing the initial restrictions, President Kennedy 
stated the purpose of the sanctions was to reduce the threat to America 
and its ideals posed by Cuba’s alignment with communist powers.24 In 
other words, Kennedy recognized that national security and democracy 
were paramount to the enactment and ultimate success of the embargo. 
The CACR had numerous additional objectives, each aimed at 
destabilizing the Cuban communist regime and keeping American soil 
safe. One of the stated goals of the CACR was to “isolate the Cuban 
government economically and deprive it of U.S. dollars.”25 Courts have 
also maintained that the objectives underlying the TWEA and the 
CACR are: (1) to deny to Cuba or its nationals hard currency which 
might be used to promote activities inimical to the interests of the 
United States; (2) to retain blocked funds for possible use to settle 
 
18. See Solomon, supra note 2, at 169; see also Cwiertney, supra note 16, at 396-97 (citing 
United States v. Fernandez-Pertierra, 523 F. Supp. 1135, 1137 (S.D. Fla. 1981)). 
19. Cuban Asset Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.415(a)(1), (6) & (7) (2016). 
20. Cwiertney, supra note 16, at 391. 
21. Matthew Frankel, Major League Problems: Baseball’s Broken System of Cuban 
Defection, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 383, 393-94 (2005). 
22. Cwiertney, supra note 16, at 397. 
23. See id. at 395-96. 
24. See Proclamation No. 3447, 3 C.F.R. § 26 (Supp. 1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (Feb. 6, 
1962) reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (2008). 
25. The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights, 
AMNESTY INT’L 8 (Sept. 2009), http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F2L2-STU5]. 
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claims against the Cuban government, or to vest to the United States if 
necessary; and (3) to use blocked funds for negotiation purposes in 
discussions with the Cuban government.26 
For thirty years, the CACR served as the primary legislative tool 
for restricting financial ties between the United States and Cuba. In the 
early 1990s, in response to decades of communist influence in Cuba 
and, purportedly, national security concerns after Cuba downed two 
unarmed US civilian aircrafts,27 the United States passed the Cuban 
Democracy Act (“CDA”) of 1992,28 and the Helms-Burton Act of 
1996,29 which tightened the grip of the Cuban sanctions. The CDA 
extended the sanctions to include a “ban on conducting business in 
Cuba to U.S.-owned or controlled business located overseas.”30 The 
Helms-Burton Act required the US government to enforce the CACR, 
doubling down on the ban that restricts MLB clubs from signing and 
scouting Cuban players.31 The Helms-Burton Act continues the 
embargo indefinitely by maintaining all of the CACR restrictions until 
a democratically elected government is in power in Cuba and by 
requiring Congressional approval before the US President may lift the 
embargo.32 The stated purposes of the CDA and the Helms-Burton Act 
were, again, national security with the aim of forcing the adoption of a 
democratically elected government in Cuba.33 
Through the latter part of the 20th century, the US government’s 
position toward Cuba remained largely unchanged. The Clinton 
administration recognized the importance of providing aid to regular 
 
26. Miranda v. Secretary of the Treasury, 766 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing Real v. 
Simon, 510 F.2d 557, 563 (5th Cir. 1975), reh’g denied, 514 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1975)). 
27. Civilian U.S. Planes Shot Down Near Cuba, CNN (Feb. 24, 1996, 12:45 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9602/cuba_shootdown/ [https://perma.cc/6ZUV-5W3N]; Tim Weiner, 
Clinton Considers Punishing Cubans for Plane Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 1996), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/26/world/clinton-considers-punishing-cubans-for-plane-
attack.html [https://perma.cc/KY2W-62QF]. 
28. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 6001 (2009) [hereinafter CDA]. 
29. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. § 6021 
(2009) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Act]. 
30. CDA, supra note 28, at § 6005. 
31. See Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C.S. § 6032(c); see also Frankel, supra note 21, at 393-
94. 
32. See Anna Kaminsky, A Major Smuggle Struggle: It’s Time for Major League Baseball 
to Step up to the Plate and Alleviate Its Cuban Smuggling Problem, 24 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 193, 198 (2016). 
33. See Solomon, supra note 2, at 170. 
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Cuban citizens, 34 so long as it circumvented the federal government.35 
In fact, in 1999 as a show of good faith toward this policy, President 
Clinton enabled two exhibition games between the Cuban National 
Baseball Team and one of the MLB clubs, with a provision that the 
profits be given only to humanitarian Cuban charities rather than to 
Castro’s regime.36 Despite these in-roads, Clinton’s successor, 
President George W. Bush, was an ardent advocate of the Cuban 
embargo and took various actions to visibly enforce its provisions.37 
The Obama administration achieved significant progress in 
improving relations with Cuba. The administration passed the Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 2009, authorizing the easing of travel and 
finance restrictions against Cuba.38 In 2015, President Obama and then-
Cuban leader Raul Castro announced that the United States and Cuba 
would formally re-establish diplomatic relations, in an effort to 
“promote . . . change in Cuba . . . in line with U.S. national security 
interests.”39 Prior to 2015, sanctions prevented Cubans who were 
legally present in the United States from earning stipends and salaries 
in excess of the individual’s living expenses.40 This relaxation of 
sanctions permitted Cuban citizens in the United States to receive a 
 
34. See generally Matthew N. Greller, Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Fastball 
Pitchers Yearning for Strike Three: How Baseball Diplomacy Can Revitalize Major League 
Baseball and United States-Cuba Relations, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1647 (1999) (examining 
the Clinton Administration’s efforts to assist the Cuban people during the Castro regime).  
35. Id. 
36. See id. at 1650-52. 
37. See Solomon, supra note 2, at 173 (discussing how Bush wanted to restrict Cuba from 
the WBC, although he eventually allowed them to participate after Castro promised to donate 
all of the proceeds to the victims of Hurricane Katrina). 
38. See generally Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 111-8, 2009 H.R. 1105 (2009); 
see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-951R, U.S. EMBARGO ON CUBA: 
RECENT REGULATORY CHANGES AND POTENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL OR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
8, (Sept. 17, 2009) (authorizing the easing of restrictions against Cuba). 
39. Peter Baker, Starting Friday, U.S. Will Ease Restrictions on Travel to Cuba, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/16/world/americas/us-eases-
decades-old-rules-on-travel-to-cuba.html [https://perma.cc/V6K2-NTK4]; see also Bureau of 
Western Hemisphere, Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations with Cuba, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (July 21, 
2015), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm [https:/perma.cc/T6CSVEUR]. 
40.  Merrit Kennedy, U.S. Eases Sanctions Against Cuba Ahead of Obama’s Landmark 
Visit, NPR (Mar. 15, 2016, 2:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/03/15/470541369/u-s-eases-sanctions-against-cuba-ahead-of-obamas-landmark-
visit [https://perma.cc/P5PT-NAFB]; OFAC and BIS Announce Additional Amendments to 
Cuba Sanctions in Advance of President Obama’s Historic Visit to Cuba, BAKER BOTTS LLP 
(Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3d0fae1d-beac-4a88-9615-
00b822e5bed5 [https://perma.cc/3M97-JTGH]. 
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more substantial salary from US companies, so long as the Cuban 
government did not subject the Cuban national to any special tax 
assessments in connection with receipt of the salary.41 
This progress came to an end with the election of President 
Trump. In 2017, in a notice issued by the State Department, President 
Trump announced a new policy with regards to Cuba, undoing the 
Obama-era leniency toward the communist state.42 The new Trump-era 
policy restricts US dollars flowing into the Cuban economy by any 
means.43 The goal of this policy, as explained by President Trump, is 
“guided by the national security and foreign policy interests of the 
United States, as well as solidarity with the Cuban people.”44 
The administration’s activation of a controversial section of the 
Helms-Burton Act, which allows Cuban Americans to sue companies 
“trafficking” in property confiscated during the 1959 revolution in US 
courts,45 exhibited this strict stance toward Cuba.46 This move is proof 
of renewed executive fervor against Cuba’s attempts to bolster its 
economy. Further, in April 2017, Former National Security Advisor 
John Bolton announced that the US Treasury Department will end “U-
turn transactions” that allow Cuba to circumvent sanctions and get 
access to “hard currency and the U.S. banking system.”47 He also 
announced new limits on remittances to Cuba of US$1,000 per person, 
 
41. 31 C.F.R. § 515.571(a)(5)(i) (2016). 
42. Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba, 82 Fed. Reg. 48875 (Oct. 
20, 2017). 
43. Id. at 48876. 
44. Id. 
45. See Alex Daugherty & Michael Wilner, Trump to Allow Cuban Americans to Sue for 
Confiscated Property in Cuba, MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 16, 2019), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article229321599.html 
[https://perma.cc/DFL3-R68C]; Stephen Wicary, Trump Nears Key Cuba Sanctions Decision 
Over Support for Maduro, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 27, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-27/trump-nears-key-cuba-sanctions-
decision-over-support-for-maduro [https://perma.cc/K4R2-3QVE]. 
46. Id.; Sam Kleiner & Lee Wolosky, Trump Administration’s New Cuba Policy Threatens 
Discord With U.S. Allies, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 25, 2019), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/63795/trump-administrations-new-cuba-policy-threatens-discord-
with-u-s-allies/ [https://perma.cc/6HPL-Q4WK]. 
47. Nick Wadhams & Nikos Chrysoloras, Trump’s Cuba Reversal on Seized Property 
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per quarter. In 2017, the State Department estimated that individuals in 
the United States sent about US$3.5 billion in remittances to family 
members in Cuba.48 
The recent tightening of sanctions is an attempt to pressure Cuba 
into withdrawing its support from Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro, 
the controversial socialist president who has long supported Cuba’s 
despotic regime.49 Although the United States has launched economic 
sanctions against Venezuela, the country is still receiving resources 
from other countries, including Cuba.50 On April 30, 2019 President 
Trump tweeted that he would impose “a full and complete embargo” 
on Cuba if the island doesn’t withdraw its security aid from what he 
considers to be a tyrannical dictatorship in Venezuela.51 In October 
2019, the Trump Administration prepared a new set of sanctions 
against Cuba over its continued support for Maduro in Venezuela.52 
The new sanctions specifically targeted Cuba’s tourism sector by 
suspending flights from the United States to nine airports in Cuba in an 
attempt to “squeeze” Cuba economically.53 US policy toward Cuba is 
highly volatile, changing on a day-to-day basis, and it remains to be 
seen how the Trump Administration will respond to the crisis in 





51. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 30, 2019, 5:09 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/112333350807899750 [https://perma.cc/EG7L-
2UA6]. 
52. See Jessica Campisi, U.S. Imposes New Sanctions on Cuba Over Human Rights, 
Venezuela, THE HILL (Oct. 18, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/466550-us-
imposes-new-sanctions-on-cuba-over-human-rights-venezuela [https://perma.cc/Q734-3XTB]; 
Matt Spetalnick & Luc Cohen, Exclusive: As Trump Grows Frustrated on Venezuela, U.S. to 
‘Squeeze’ Cuba, Scrutinize Russia, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-venezuela-exclusive/exclusive-as-trump-grows-frustrated-on-venezuela-us-to-squeeze-
cuba-scrutinize-russia-idUSKBN1WO2CL [https://perma.cc/9MPX-EYFF]. 
53. Id; see also Zach Montague, Trump Administration Cuts Flights to Most Cuban 
Airports, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/25/us/politics/flights-
cuba-trump.html [https://perma.cc/9ACZ-PQQC]. 
54. This Note does not consider events past October 31, 2019. 
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III. OFAC LICENSING: TO REVIEW OR NOT TO REVIEW THE 
EXCEPTIONS TO THE SANCTIONS 
The TWEA gives authority to the President to control all 
transactions between the United States and any covered nation under 
the TWEA, including Cuba.55 However, the TWEA gives the Secretary 
of the Treasury the authority to promulgate regulations enforcing the 
aims of the TWEA.56 As part of this enforcement, the US Treasury’s 
Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”) has authority under the 
CACR to grant specific and general licenses exempting certain 
individuals and enterprises from the reach of the omnibus sanctions.57 
OFAC can authorize a license to enable an individual or a 
business entity to conduct business in Cuba with Cuban citizens or to 
unblock a restricted Cuban national.58 The US Treasury Department 
defines a license as an “authorization from OFAC to engage in a 
transaction that otherwise would be prohibited.”59 There are two types 
of licenses: specific licenses and general licenses. A specific license is 
a formal written document issued by OFAC on a case-by-case basis, 
authorizing a particular transaction on a limited basis and only in 
response to a written application.60 A general license, on the other hand, 
authorizes a particular type of transaction for a broader class of persons 
without the need to continually apply for a license.61 
OFAC has broad discretion in deciding when to issue licenses that 
authorize otherwise prohibited business dealings.62 OFAC may amend 
or rescind existing licenses at any time as long as the decision is 
reasonably related to foreign policy concerns, and courts typically 
 
55. Trading with the Enemy Act, 12 U.S.C. §95a (2010). 
56. 31 C.F.R. § 515.802 (1999). 
57. 31 C.F.R § 515.505 (2016) (prohibiting, among other things, the “withdrawal from the 
United States of . . . currency” to Cuba without the authorization of the Secretary of the 
Treasury); see also Lynn R. Coleman  & Thomas R. Graham, The Stars and Stripes Wherever: 
The Impact of Unilateral U.S. Economic Sanctions on the International Petroleum Industry, 35 
ALTA. L. REV. 334, 338 (1996). 
58. 31 C.F.R § 515.505 (2016). 




62. See Court E. Golumbic & Robert S. Ruff III, ARTICLE: Leveraging the Three Core 
Competencies:  How OFAC Licensing Optimizes Holistic Sanctions, 38 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. 
REG. 729, 783-85 (2013) (analyzing OFAC’s lack of transparency in the licensing process as a 
means to maintain its discretion in granting or not granting licenses).  
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interpret these decisions with great deference to OFAC.63 OFAC’s 
interpretation of its own regulations receives Auer deference, which 
calls for OFAC’s own interpretation to be given controlling weight 
unless the interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation or statute.64 Interestingly enough, OFAC does not issue 
opinions, explain its reasoning, or discuss individual license 
applications and denials thereof with the media.65 OFAC decisions are 
not immune from judicial review under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (“APA”)—however, OFAC decisions that are based on substantial 
evidence and that are not arbitrary or capricious must be affirmed by 
the reviewing court.66 Further, any regulatory announcement by OFAC 
is merely a policy decision that can easily be reversed or narrowed.67 
OFAC can revisit a license proclamation and reinterpret it or reverse it, 
often based on pressure from the executive branch.68 
There is extensive evidence of this OFAC action in the past 
decade through its relationship with MLB. In 2012, MLB formally 
announced the requirement that Cuban players must receive a specific 
license from OFAC before they could sign with an MLB franchise.69 
Under this policy, teams were not able to sign Cuban nationals until 
OFAC had issued a specific license to that player, effectively slowing 
the license application process to a standstill and restricting access to 
the United States for these players.70 To acquire a specific license, a 
Cuban-born player would have to establish residency in a third-party 
country, where a team would then have to individually request that the 
 
63. See Walsh v. Brady, 927 F.2d 1229, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding OFAC’s 
authority to deny a license to travel to Cuba is reasonable when considered in light of foreign 
policy concerns). 
64. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); see also Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi Ministry, 
27 F.3d 695, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating OFAC interpretation of Sanctions Regulations 
accords greater judicial deference because such regulations are OFAC regulations). 
65. See generally Jack Curry, Baseball: New Effort by MLB to Include Cuba in World 
Classic, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2005), at D3 (reviewing MLB’s revised application for OFAC 
special license permitting Cuban participation). 
66. See John O’Brien, Political Balk: Opening the Door for U.S.-Cuba Policy Reform via 
Diplomatic Blunder at the World Baseball Classic, 15 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 135, 
161-62 (2008). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 160-62.  
69. See Aaron Klein & Jake E. Marcus, United States-Cuba Normalized Relations and the 
MLB Influence: The Baseball Coalition Committee, 47 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 258, 285 
(2016). 
70. Id. at 285. 
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specific player be “unblocked” by OFAC before being able to sign the 
player to a contract.71 MLB’s attempts to quell human trafficking 
violations where smugglers were falsifying passports and other 
residency documents triggered this rule change.72 By sending all 
unblocking residency paperwork to OFAC, the league could defer to a 
governing body more equipped to handle immigration processes and 
verification.73 The specific license application process requires 
evidence that the player established permanent residence in a third 
country and that the player never intends to return to Cuba.74 
That policy rapidly changed thereafter, with President Obama’s 
2014 announcement regarding the expansion of general licenses for 
individuals and businesses wishing to conduct financial transactions in 
Cuba or with Cuban nationals.75 This sweeping change permitted 
businesses in the United States to more readily obtain general licenses, 
which are required in order to negotiate with and hire Cuban nationals, 
as long as no funds are paid to the Cuban government in connection 
with the hire. MLB obtained a general license to contract with all 
Cuban defectors, eliminating the cumbersome specific license 
process.76 For example, when Cuban outfielder Yoan Moncada became 
the first player to apply to OFAC for a specific license following the 
announcement,77 OFAC responded by stating that it “will not grant a 
specific license to Cuban nationals who are already unblocked via the 
general license.”78 In other words, because Moncada met the 
prerequisites of MLB’s general unblocking license—he possessed at 
least two permanent residency documents from a third country—he 
need not apply for a specific license after the Obama proclamation.79 
This significantly eased the requirements for Cubans to play baseball 
 
71. See Drew M. Goorabian, Baseball’s Cuban Missile Crisis: How the United States and 
Major League Baseball Can End Cuban Ballplayer Trafficking, 20 UCLA J. INT’L L. FOREIGN 
AFF. 425, 441 (2016). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 442. 
74. Id. 
75. 31 C.F.R. § 515.505. Under the new general license in Section 515.505 of Treasury’s 
Cuban Asset Control Regulations, Cuban nationals can become unblocked if they take up 
permanent residence outside of Cuba, obtain required residence documentation and show they 
are not a prohibited Cuban government official or member of the Cuban Communist Party. 
76. Klein & Marcus, supra note 69, at 303. 
77. See id. 
78. Townsend, supra note 6. 
79. See id. 
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in the major leagues. Because all defectors were now covered under the 
general license, all that was required of the players at the time was to 
defect, obtain legal residency in a third country, and sign a statement 
saying that they had abandoned their Cuban citizenship forever.80 They 
no longer needed to wait through a lengthy and uncertain approval 
process for a specific license.81 However, many, including the new 
OFAC department in the Trump Administration, see the Obama-era 
general license relaxation as an endorsement or clear stimulus to unsafe 
defection, human trafficking, and illegal payments to the Cuban 
government.82 
IV. THE NECESSITY OF DEFECTION: MLB’S INTERACTION 
WITH THE CUBAN SANCTIONS 
In 1961, Fidel Castro abolished professional baseball in Cuba, 
instituting an amateur-only league, with players receiving minuscule 
wages in conformance with the paradigm of national ideals over free 
enterprise.83 The average Cuban player makes the equivalent of 
roughly US$40 per month.84 On the other hand, the average MLB 
salary is close to US$300,000 per month.85 Cubans, especially Cuban 
athletes with a chance to earn substantially more money outside of the 
communist regime, began defecting in significant numbers.86 
Initially, MLB took a very hard stance against Cuban nationals, 
in-line with the strict adherence to the CACR at the time. In 1977, MLB 
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn issued a directive, which was updated in 
1991, and then again as recently as 2016, to enforce the prohibition on 
“[team’s] discussion or negotiation with anyone in Cuba regarding the 
signing of any player in Cuba.”87 In other words, MLB fully intended 
 
80. Id. 
81. See id. 
82. Id. 
83. Frankel, supra note 21, at 390. 
84. Michael Powell, For Cuban Players, No Embargo on Dream, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/24/sports/baseball/in-cuba-no-embargo-on-hope-as-
baseball-players-say-take-me-to-america.html [https://perma.cc/B5LR-3WPJ]. In 2014, “[t]he 
Cuban government pays the baseball players, who make, on average, $40 a month.” Id. 
85. See Jim Woodruff, How Much Money do Baseball Players Make?, CHRON (June 29, 
2018), https://work.chron.com/much-money-baseball-players-make-14452.html 
[https://perma.cc/JQ9F-LC5D] (stating that the average Major League Baseball Player earned 
US$4.38 Million in 2018).  
86. See generally Solomon, supra note 2. 
87. Frankel, supra note 21, at 397; see also Greller, supra note 34, at 1664-65. 
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to cooperate with the restrictions of the CACR and enforce any 
violations of the CACR by member teams.88 Thus, Cuban players had 
virtually no legal route to the United States and the major leagues. 
However, teams and agents saw that this directive created a dangerous 
loophole that MLB teams and human traffickers exploited.89 A player 
would defect to a third country, obtain residency, and enter the United 
States stripped of their Cuban citizenship and able to sign with any 
MLB club for a substantial salary without violating the CACR or the 
MLB rules enforcing it.90 
MLB rules indicate that any resident of the United States or 
Canada or any student enrolled in high school or college in the United 
States who has never before signed a major league or minor league 
contract is subject to the amateur draft – a lottery process by which 
teams are allowed to select and sign players to their clubs for close to 
amateur salary.91 However, international players are not subject to the 
amateur draft, and may sign with any club they choose as “free agents,” 
typically for a much higher salary.92 That is, of course, except Cuban 
international players who, if they safely defect directly to the United 
States, are the only international born players forced to participate in 
the less lucrative amateur draft.93 Therefore, if a Cuban player defects 
to a third country and establishes legal residency there, that player is 
not subject to the general amateur draft rule, which limits the amount 
of money the player can make as well as team flexibility and additional 
MLB options.94 Instead, these players bypass the draft and sign a 
contract with a team of their choice as free agents, usually for much 
more money.95 
American jurisprudence and MLB policy substantiated this 
loophole when, in 2001, Cuban ballplayer Rolando Viera defected 
directly to the United States from Cuba, receiving refugee status on his 
visa, meaning the Cuban pitcher would be subjected to the amateur 
 
88. See generally Greller, supra note 34. 
89. Cwiertney, supra note 16, at 412. 
90. See generally Cwiertney, supra note 16. 
91. See Frankel, supra note 21, at 397. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. See Cwiertney, supra note 16, at 412-13. 
95. Id. at 413-14. 
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draft.96 Viera filed a motion for emergency injunctive relief, trying to 
prevent MLB from interfering with his ability to act as a free agent.  He 
argued that the difficulties in defecting and the salary restrictions 
inherent in the draft were discriminatory towards Cuban players.97 
MLB successfully opposed these motions, which effectively 
strengthened the defection regime and actually encouraged the third 
country residency path toward free agency, legitimizing these 
dangerous loopholes.98 Since 1991, over two hundred Cuban 
ballplayers have attempted defection, with only a small fraction being 
awarded a lucrative contract by an MLB club.99 
V. THE 2018 MLB-FCB AGREEMENT: DETAILS AND ANALYSIS 
Largely in response to the loophole in CACR-MLB enforcement, 
MLB and the FCB reached the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement, which 
allowed for the safe and legal signing of Cuban nationals to MLB 
clubs.100 MLB and the FCB announced the three-year deal on 
December 19, 2018.101 Its stated objective was to “end the dangerous 
trafficking of Cuban players who desire to play professional baseball 
in the United States.”102 MLB cited similarly structured deals with the 
Japanese league, the Korean Baseball Organization, and the Chinese 
Professional Baseball league as precedent for success of this type of 
financial model.103 The 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement required the FCB 
to release all players under contract who are at least twenty-five years 
old and have six or more years of playing experience for free agency.104 
From there, the players are free to negotiate and sign with any MLB 
club without leaving Cuba, and may return to Cuba during the off-
season105—a sharp reversal from decades of tightly enforced 
 
96. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Baseball Diplomacy, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 473, 
482 (2001). 
97. See Evan Brewster, Cuban Baseball Players in America: Changing the Difficult Route 
to Chasing the Dream, 5 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 215, 225 (2016). 
98. Id. at 225 (citing Viera v. Major League Baseball Enters., No. 8:01-CV-1037-T-
27MAP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26155 (M.D. Fla. June 4, 2001)).  
99. Klein & Marcus, supra note 69, at 271. 
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restrictions on negotiating with Cuban nationals. An existing general 
license granted by OFAC at the tail end of the Obama Administration 
made the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement possible.106 OFAC’s 
determination that the FCB was independent of the central Cuban 
government was also crucial in enabling this agreement.107 
However, there is a significant wrinkle in the 2018 MLB-FCB 
Agreement that sent shockwaves through policymakers’ offices in 
Washington. An MLB club that signs a player released by the FCB 
pursuant to this agreement would be forced to pay the FCB a “release 
fee.”108 This is permitted by the OFAC license and determination, as 
well as an agreement from the Cuban government not to charge the 
players “any special tax” beyond that assessed on any other Cuban 
national who works abroad.109 Despite OFAC’s determination 
regarding the FCB’s independence from the Cuban Government, many 
lawmakers were not convinced.110   
Cuban Ambassador Jose Ramon Cabanas expressed his 
government’s support for the deal—fueled in part by the Vice President 
of the FCB, Antonio Castro—the youngest son of Fidel Castro—a fact 
certainly not lost upon opponents of the 2018 MLB-FCB 
 
106. Jordan Kobritz, An Analysis of What the Deal Between MLB and the Cuban Baseball 
Federation Means to the Sport, SPORTS LAW EXPERT (Dec. 24, 2018), 
https://sportslawexpert.com/2018/12/24/exclusive-an-analysis-of-what-the-deal-between-mlb-
and-the-cuban-baseball-federation-means-to-the-sport/ [https://perma.cc/QK9Z-TCX7] (“MLB 
believes the proposed arrangement is permitted under provisions of a general license it received 
from the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in 2016”). 
107. Diamond & Salama, supra note 11. 
108. Id. The Release Fee owed to the FCB by the MLB Club that signs an FCB Player is 
calculated using the same formula embodied in MLB’s agreements with the NPB, KBO, and 
CPBL (i.e., between fifteen percent and twenty percent of the total guaranteed value for Major 
League contracts, and twenty-five percent of the signing bonus for Minor League contracts. In 
addition, Supplemental Release Fees may be owed if a contract with an FCB Player contains 
bonuses, escalators, or options that are later triggered. The Release Fee (and any Supplemental 
Release Fee) paid by the MLB Club is in addition to the compensation agreed to by the MLB 
Club to the FCB Player in the player’s contract, which will be paid by the MLB Club directly to 
the FCB Player. 
109. Id. 
110. See generally Alison Peck, Did MLB Clubs Violate RICO?, INT’L TRADE L. PROF. 
BLOG (Nov. 17, 2018), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/inttradelaw/2018/11/did-mlb-clubs-
violate-rico.html [https://perma.cc/N55L-6BAE]. Mimi Whitefield, MLB, Cuban Baseball 
Federation Sign Agreement to Limit Defections, Trafficking of Players, WLRN (Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://www.wlrn.org/post/mlb-cuban-baseball-federation-sign-agreement-limit-defections-
trafficking-players [https://perma.cc/KDW9-XLK8]. 
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Agreement.111 However, proponents point to the fact that the 
International Olympic Committee recognizes the FCB as independent 
of the central government.112 Amidst these disagreements, in April 
2019, the Trump Administration invalidated the 2018 MLB-FCB 
Agreement.113 Nikole Thomas, OFAC’s acting assistant director of 
licensing, wrote in a letter to MLB’s counsel that “a payment to the 
Cuban Baseball Federation is a payment to the Cuban government.”114 
A. MLB’s Position 
There are two opposing approaches to the sanctions against Cuba 
with regard to the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement. On one hand, 
supporters of the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement, including MLB, argue 
that the agreement is necessary to combat human trafficking and that 
the release fee is not a payment to the Cuban government. On the other 
hand, opponents argue that the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement is a threat 
to national security and illegally stimulates the Cuban economy. This 
Section and the following Section will examine each side’s primary 
arguments in support of their position.115 Finally, this Note will 
determine which side’s interpretation is more in line with the objectives 
of the Cuba sanctions and what next steps MLB and the Trump 
Administration should take to eliminate the risk of human trafficking 
and persistent international financial crime. 
 
1. The 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement Would End the Defection Norm 
and Significantly Curb Human Trafficking 
First, MLB’s stated purpose for the implementation of the 2018 
MLB-FCB Agreement was the hope of reducing defection,116 which is 
not only dangerous but requires the involvement of human traffickers 
and potential government corruption and bribery.117 There have been 
several instances in which MLB has turned a blind eye toward human 
 
111. Diamond & Salama, supra note 11. 
112. See Kobritz, supra note 106; Zimbalist, supra note 9. 
113. Diamond & Salama, supra note 11. 
114. Id. 
115. See infra Sections V.A. & V.B.  
116. MLB Announcement, supra note 5. 
117. See supra Part IV.  
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trafficking. The 2018 MLB-FCB agreement sought to eliminate these 
instances. 
MLB has recognized the burden that the current defection system 
places on Cuban players, but has long been silent, and even complicit, 
in the persistence of the human trafficking of Cuban-born baseball 
players.118 MLB Deputy Commissioner Dan Halem acknowledges that 
Cuban players are “often forced to contract with criminal smuggling 
gangs and pay a fair amount of money from their signing bonuses to 
smugglers.”119 The loopholes created by MLB rules and adherence to 
the CACR, which encourage defection, have allowed Cuban defectors 
to sign a combined US$300+ million in contracts in MLB since 2009, 
and provide an undeniable financial incentive for human traffickers to 
profit off of MLB’s leniency.120 Often, smugglers are able to capitalize 
on these loopholes to traffic Cuban players without committing a 
material violation of the law.121 
In 2011, Cuban national Leonys Martin signed a contract with the 
Texas Rangers of MLB worth US$15.5 million, including a US$5 
million signing bonus.122 Whereas a typical MLB agent will glean three 
to five percent commission from that deal, Martin paid thirty-five 
percent.123 However, the money was not paid to an agent for the 
procurement of a contract, as is typical; Martin paid Eliezer Lazo, a 
notorious human trafficker who smuggled Martin out of Cuba.124 
 
118. See Ahiza Garcia & Jose Pagliery, MLB Accused of Ignoring Cuban Player 
Smuggling, CNN MONEY (Dec. 15, 2016, 3:31 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2016/12/15/news/mlb-cuban-baseball-players-smuggled/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/7Z98-NYGS]; Lind, supra note 4.  
119. Whitefield, supra note 110. 
120. See generally Goorabian, supra note 71. 
121. Id. 
122. Richard Durrett, Rangers Sign Leonys Martin, ESPN (May 4, 2011), 
http://www.espn.com/dallas/mlb/news/story?id=6478110 [https://perma.cc/B5XJ-T8MS]; 
Aaron Gleeman, Rangers Finalize $15.5 Million MLB Deal with Cuban Outfielder Leonys 
Martin, NBC SPORTS (May 4, 2011, 12:20 PM), https://mlb.nbcsports.com/2011/05/04/rangers-
finalize-15-5-million-mlb-deal-with-cuban-outfielder-leonys-martin/ [https://perma.cc/7YU7-
3V66]. 
123. Nick Bond, Eliezer Lazo Pleads Guilty to Extortion of Cubans, Including Leonys 
Martin, SBNATION (Aug. 22, 2014, 8:19 PM), 
https://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2014/8/22/6058205/eliezer-lazo-guilty-plea-extortion-leonys-
martin-cuba [https://perma.cc/TDA2-WF5W]. Drew Davison, Rangers’ Martin Says he was 
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Federal prosecutors charged Lazo with conspiring to smuggle, kidnap, 
and extort Cuban Baseball Players.  He was sentenced to over fourteen 
years in federal prison for his role running a human-trafficking ring that 
smuggled Cubans into Mexico, where they were held prisoner until 
ransom payments were made under the threat of withholding the 
processing of residency documents that would enable the players to 
sign with MLB teams.125 This scenario with Martin and Lazo was 
commonplace among Cuban ballplayers, and the 2018 MLB-FCB 
Agreement was designed to eliminate these criminal enterprises 
entirely.126 
In 2017, a federal jury in Miami found a baseball agent, Bart 
Hernandez, guilty of smuggling Cuban ballplayers into the United 
States.127 The government alleged a scheme of coercing players, 
falsifying documents, and carrying out illegal border crossings in order 
to collect large percentages of the contracts that Cuban players 
eventually signed with MLB clubs.128 After arranging with boat 
captains to extract top baseball players from Cuba, the traffickers 
allegedly set up the players in Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican 
Republic with handlers and fixers who helped the players establish 
residency in third countries through fraudulent means.129 They then 
helped the players apply to be “unblocked” by the OFAC so the players 
could become MLB free agents.130 Players were then forced by 
individuals like Hernandez into signing over between twenty and 
thirty-five percent of their lucrative contracts with MLB teams, often 
through threats against the players’ families and livelihoods if the 
player chose not to comply with the smugglers.131 
 
125. See id. 
126. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.  
127. Mike Oz, MLB Agent Found Guilty of Smuggling Cuban Baseball Players into the 
U.S., YAHOO SPORTS (Mar. 15, 2017, 5:37 PM), Arthur Weinstein, Men Who Smuggled Cuban 
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Given the high-profile nature of these cases, MLB was under 
immense pressure to address these human trafficking concerns. The 
2018 MLB-FCB Agreement, which MLB claims eliminates the need 
for agents to pay smugglers for residency in third party countries, will 
dry up the market and ultimately serve as an impetus to remove human 
traffickers from the Cuban immigration process entirely. However, 
MLB is a non-state actor and therefore not a party to any international 
treaty, nor technically obligated under international human trafficking 
law.132 Nonetheless, MLB is at risk of violating two related laws—
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) and the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (“FCPA”)— if the 2018 MLB-
FCB Agreement remains invalidated.133 The league is acutely aware of 
the risks of violating these laws, and it argues that an invalidation of 
the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement will only contribute to an unwanted 
increase in criminal enterprises.134 
2. The 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement Would Prevent RICO 
Violations by MLB and its Teams 
The first of these laws under which MLB risks violation is RICO. 
RICO prohibits the investment of proceeds of a pattern of racketeering 
in an enterprise; the acquiring or maintaining of an interest in an 
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering; participating in an 
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering; or conspiring to do any of 
the above.135 To prove a RICO violation, prosecutors would have to 
prove that the defendants (MLB or its teams) committed certain 
predicate offenses, specifically enumerated in the definition of 
racketeering activity.136 These include identify fraud,137 forgery or 
 
132. See MATH NOORTMANN ET AL., NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 
(2015). Under international law, unless the treaty was created with the express intention to bind 
the third-party non-state actor, and unless that third party non-state actor has consented with 
signature, the third-party non-state actor is not technically bound to the treaty’s obligations. 
133. See infra Sections V.A.2. & V.A.3. 
134. See Peck, supra note 110. 
135. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988). 
136. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2016). 
137. 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006) (outlining criminal penalties not just for people who hold or 
use fake IDs, but also for anyone who “knowingly transfers an identification document . . . or a 
false identification document” if the person knew it was stolen or unlawfully produced). 
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false use of passports,138 misuse of passports,139 and “any act or threat 
involving murder, kidnapping, . . . robbery, bribery, extortion.”140 
RICO violations call for federal prosecution and criminal penalties.141 
“Any person injured in his business or property by any reason of a 
violation of [RICO]” may bring civil lawsuits as well.142 One example 
of a potential RICO violation arises when law abiding sports agents in 
the United States are locked out from representing Cuban players by 
smugglers like Lazo and Hernandez, who coerce Cuban players to 
retain them as agents as a result of the current corrupt defection 
system.143 
In order to be guilty of participation in an enterprise through a 
pattern of racketeering, prosecutors or plaintiffs must prove that the 
defendant conducted or participated in the “operation or management” 
of the enterprise.144 As applied, this can be very difficult to prove, 
depending on the structure of the organization and its activities.145 
However, case law dictates that MLB and the individual clubs likely 
constitute “enterprises” that would be “separate from the individuals 
participating in them” for purposes of a RICO section 1962 claim.146 
Further, multiple illegal signings or player representations within a ten-
year period may show the requisite pattern of acts to prove “part of an 
ongoing entity’s regular way of doing business.”147 Many MLB clubs 
that feature multiple Cuban players may already be in violation of this 
section. Also, team or MLB employees may have conducted or 
participated in activities related to these questionable signings. The 
definition of “operation or management” stretches quite far and often 
 
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1543 (2002) (providing for fines or imprisonment for “whoever willfully 
and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for use any . . . false, forged, 
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141. See id. 
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143. See Peck, supra note 110. 
144. Id. 
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146. See Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001) (holding that 
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147. See, e.g., United States v. Busacca, 936 F.2d 232, 238 (6th Cir. 1991). 
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attaches to anyone in the chain of command responsible for the 
facilitation of illegally obtained players and residency papers.148 
If the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement remains invalidated and this 
system continues, there is no doubt that MLB, its teams, or its 
representatives will violate the predicate offenses to a RICO breach. In 
fact, MLB and the DOJ are already aware of one very high-profile 
potential violation. As part of the trial against Bart Hernandez, Cuban 
defector and current MLB player Jose Abreu testified that he was 
ordered to falsify a passport by his smugglers in order to safely obtain 
entry into the United States from Haiti, the nation that he defected to in 
order to obtain third-country residency.149 Abreu was given a passport 
in Haiti containing his photo, but with a false name and birth date, that 
he was told to destroy in order to not raise suspicions about his entry 
into the United States.150 In a shocking revelation, Abreu testified that 
he had no choice but to eat the page containing the false name before 
his plane landed in Miami if he hoped to remain in the United States.151 
“Little by little I swallowed that first page of the passport. I could not 
arrive in the United States with a false passport,” he said.152 Given 
MLB’s alleged complicity in these smuggling operations, it is not hard 
to imagine that MLB was aware that Abreu was arriving with falsified 
documents, and intentionally did not inquire into the details behind 
such falsification. This harrowing, infamous revelation is further 
evidence that without a safe and legal deal in place between MLB and 
Cuba, racketeering activity and RICO violations will continue. Thus, 
to avoid RICO prosecution, and to curb the manipulation of 
international law for financial gain by its teams and representatives, 
MLB and its member teams have a very strong incentive to 
reimplement the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement. 
 
148. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993) (“outsiders” may violate 
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3. The 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement would Alleviate Liability for 
Current and Future FCPA Violations 
Perhaps most significantly, MLB’s desire to implement the 2018 
MLB-FCB Agreement is in direct response to the threat of FCPA 
prosecution. Congress enacted the FCPA for the purpose of making it 
unlawful for certain classes of persons and entities to make payments 
to foreign government officials to assist in obtaining or retaining 
business.153 The FCPA at its core is an anti-bribery and anti-corruption 
law, applying to payments made both in the United States and 
abroad.154 Specifically, MLB franchises may be liable based on 
scouting and signing activities conducted on their behalf by third 
parties in Cuba and other countries. FCPA liability attaches if the 
covered party gives anything of value to any other person while 
knowing that this third party will make an improper payment to a 
foreign official.155 The standard for knowledge is low—the covered 
party can face liability for having mere awareness that the unlawful 
conduct has a high probability of occurring.156 The absence of an actual 
knowledge requirement ensures that a covered party, like MLB, cannot 
escape FCPA liability by being willfully blind to facts and 
circumstances that would tend to indicate unlawful conduct.157 In other 
words, if a scout gives something of value to a member of a foreign 
government, or to a “buscone”158—international handlers or smugglers 
like Lazo and Hernandez—who contracts with a foreign government to 
clear the way for a player’s signing, that could be an FCPA violation.159 
From the perspective of MLB, or its member teams, any payments or 
kickbacks to buscones and any payments made to achieve the 
falsification of papers for an athlete, including age records or drug 
 
153. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq. (2010). 
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testing records, would almost certainly fit within the broad definition 
of business purpose.160 
MLB is currently in the midst of a FCPA investigation.161 In 
September 2018, authorities announced that a federal grand jury was 
looking into MLB teams’ international dealings and has issued 
subpoenas to club officials and other personnel involved in human 
trafficking of Latin American, and primarily Cuban, athletes.162 
Specifically, the DOJ is targeting potential violations of the FCPA in 
relation to the bribing of government officials for better access to these 
valuable Cuban players.163 The probe is particularly concerned with 
investigating buscones, who typically bribe local government officials 
in order to facilitate the legal residency paperwork for the Cuban 
defector.164 In many cases, a buscone will arrange for an illegal and 
dangerous defection out of Cuba and then when a player lands in the 
Dominican Republic, Haiti or another country, the buscone will try to 
arrange for residency, perhaps in unlawful ways.165 The Justice 
Department is likely interested in the role of American agents in 
negotiating with buscones, and holding teams liable for giving 
direction to these negotiations. 
The dossier given to the FBI as part of this investigation suggests 
the extent to which some MLB personnel are aware of—and brazenly 
discuss—this unscrupulous culture and the potential for corruption.166 
One particularly remarkable document shows that in 2015, a team’s 
executives went so far as to develop a database that measured the 
perceived “level of egregious behavior” displayed by fifteen of their 
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own employees in Latin America.167 That is, using a scale of “innocent 
bystander” to “criminal,” front-office executives assessed their own 
staff’s level of corruption. Documents show that five employees earned 
a “criminal” rating.168 Internal team communications show concerns 
about what team officials called a “mafia” entrenched in their 
operations, including a key employee who dealt “with the agents and 
buscones” and was “unbelievably corrupt.”169 The FBI suspected other 
team personnel were tied to “altered books” or “shady dealings,” 
according to the documents.170 The dossier also appears to describe 
efforts to circumvent federal laws and MLB rules requiring Cuban 
players to establish residency in another country before negotiating and 
signing with a team.171 Among those efforts to circumvent, the dossier 
includes a transcript of a text message conversation between two 
Dodgers executives in which they discuss the need to “shred” a contract 
signed with a player before MLB had approved the document.172 There 
are also indications that dates on other official documents were 
doctored before they were forwarded to the MLB office.173 
If reinstatement of the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement fails, MLB is 
at risk of numerous FCPA violations. Without a safe and legal route for 
Cuban baseball players to gain access to MLB free agency, teams and 
their representatives will continue to “brib[e] clerks or immigration 
officials to change dates of birth on identification documents, or to 
fabricate false identity documents,” in violation of the FCPA.174 If the 
DOJ brings these potential violations to light as part of its grand jury 
probe, it will shine a spotlight on MLB’s alleged complicity in human 
trafficking and international crime. Thus, to avoid FCPA prosecution, 
and to curb the corrupt culture that has sprung out of the complicity 
toward the defection regime, MLB and its member teams have a 
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4. The 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement is Consistent with the Original 
National Security Objectives of TWEA and CACR 
Supporters of the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement feel that there is no 
harm to national security interests through any interaction between the 
United States and the FCB, and believe that excluding sports, like 
baseball, from the sanctions is actually a way to benefit the Cuban 
people.175 Supporters of the agreement argue that the sanctions have 
only harmed the Cuban people while propping up the communist rulers 
in the nation.176 The American Association for World Health issued a 
report indicating that the embargo “has dramatically harmed the health 
and nutrition of large numbers of ordinary Cuban citizens. As 
documented by [our] report, it is our expert medical opinion that the 
United States embargo has caused a significant rise in suffering-and 
even deaths-in Cuba.”177 
Some point to the “release fee” portion of the 2018 MLB-FCB 
Agreement and argue that Cuba would use such money to fund 
violations of human rights and endanger US national security.178 
However, the release fees are nominal, and the revenue will be used for 
baseball purposes, including improving baseball stadiums and fields, 
and purchasing equipment for youth leagues.179 Putting aside the 
debate over whether the FCB is an arm of the Cuban government, the 
deal specifically calls for funds to  remain independent of any national 
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security implementation.180 The funds are to be inserted into a quasi-
non-profit model that, at least according to MLB, will be used only for 
the growth of youth baseball in Cuba.181 Further, US$2 million is a drop 
in the bucket from Cuba’s US$62.11 billion annual budget, or the US$3 
billion annual revenue generated from tourism to the island.182 US 
airline, financial and telecommunications companies have legally made 
payments to the Cuban government in excess of US$100 million in 
recent years, with no recognition of national security concerns from the 
Executive Branch.183 The benefits that the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement 
provide are tangible and plenty, and the risk to national security is 
miniscule. In fact, by fighting human trafficking head on, this deal 
indirectly promotes national security, by preventing millions of dollars 
a year from ending up in the hands of violent gangs, smugglers, and 
narco-traffickers. 
B. Trump Administration Position 
1. The 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement is a Threat to National Security 
and Illegally Stimulates the Cuban Economy 
In contrast to MLB’s position, the Trump Administration and the 
Treasury Department emphatically assert that a payment to the FCB is 
a payment to the Cuban government, and that any payment to the 
Cuban government is a threat to national security.184 Opponents of the 
2018 MLB-FCB Agreement in the Trump administration contend that 
it would betray the core and longstanding purpose of the embargo; to 
prevent money from reaching Cuba, thus destabilizing the Cuban 
economy and the Cuban government.185 They allege this agreement 
would give credibility and legitimacy to the Cuban government’s 
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leadership, which goes against the core fundamentals of the TWEA, 
the CACR, and broad foreign policy with regards to Cuba.186 
The Trump Administration’s broad crackdown on the “Troika of 
Tyranny”—the alliance of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua—is 
evidence of the hard stance toward Cuban relations.187 The Trump 
Administration has criticized Cuba for supporting Nicolás Maduro, the 
Venezuelan despot who the United States opposes as an illegitimate 
leader.  Maduro has cut off humanitarian and financial assistance to any 
of his dissidents in Venezuela and around the world.188 Cuba has 
remained a firm ally of Maduro, receiving Venezuelan oil in exchange 
for doctors and other specialists and intelligence, which has helped 
Maduro remain in power despite demands from Washington and more 
than fifty other governments that he end his tyrannical rule.189 The 
Trump Administration is essentially asserting that any supplement to 
the Cuban economy, even in the form of release fees paid to the FCB, 
indirectly supports the illegitimate regime of Maduro in Venezuela. 
Support of this regime would be, in effect, harming the country’s 
national security by sacrificing American values of freedom and 
democracy. 
2. The Obama-Era OFAC Determination that the FCB is 
Independent of the Cuban Government was Factually Incorrect 
Republican legislators have vehemently pushed back on the 
Obama-era OFAC determination that FCB is not part of the Cuban 
government. Marco Rubio, a Cuban-American congressman, called 
this determination “factually incorrect” and a “farce.”190 He argued that 
essentially, the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement is legalizing bribery from 
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MLB clubs to Cuban government officials since the FCB’s finances are 
entirely at the disposal of the governing regime.191 Rubio went on to 
compare the deal to a ransom paid to the Cuban government, i.e., a 
payment to facilitate legalized human trafficking.192 John Bolton, 
President Trump’s former national security adviser, agrees with Rubio, 
and explained that “Cuba wants to use baseball players as economic 
pawns—selling their rights to Major League Baseball.”193 
The Trump administration provided some precedent for Rubio 
and Bolton’s concerns regarding OFAC’s determination that the FCB 
is part of the Cuban government.194 The Trump administration 
prohibited trade with much of the tourism industry in Cuba on the 
grounds that Cuban military and intelligence interests owned 
substantial hidden shares of those businesses.195 But if a hotel with an 
international brand is part of the Cuban government for purposes of the 
embargo, it is hard to see how the FCB—which was led by the son of 
Fidel Castro and is one of the most prominent organizations in the 
country—is not. The Obama-era OFAC relied on the fact that the 
Olympic Committee treats FCB as a nongovernmental organization.196 
However, the relevant question is whether the FCB is part of the Cuban 
government as defined in the embargo statutes and regulations, not 
under Olympic Committee policies.197 
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3. The 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement was Merely an Attempt to 
Circumnavigate Continued Criminal Violations 
Opponents of the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement criticize its timing, 
alleging that MLB is simply trying to save face as more details of its 
complicity in the human trafficking of Cuban players and FCPA 
violations are revealed.198 Convicted smuggler Gilberto Suarez claims 
that MLB tolerates—knowingly or unknowingly—a criminal 
enterprise  transporting players to the United States.199 He claims that 
MLB clubs, which are not allowed to scout in Cuba, are always 
traveling wherever the Cuban teams go, communicating with agents 
and smugglers simultaneously to get intel on when a player will be 
available to sign.200 MLB’s concern was never with the conditions of 
their future player’s defection or whether his passport and residency 
documents were compliant with the applicable law—only whether his 
residency was facially “legal.”201 In fact, certain investigators on the 
matter even believed that MLB teams were conspiring with human 
traffickers to bring specific players out of Cuba.202 Thus, the Trump 
Administration sees the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement as less of a means 
of curbing human trafficking, and more of an attempt to save face 
before criminal and civil penalties are officially levied. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MLB AND THE TRUMP 
ADMINISTRATION TO END THE CRIMES INHERENT IN THE 
DEFECTION PROCESS WHILE COMPLYING WITH ECONOMIC 
SANCTIONS 
A. MLB Should Implement a Worldwide Draft 
The baseball community has long explored the idea of 
implementing a worldwide draft, with the main benefit being the 
elimination of the lucrative free agency status of international players, 
specifically targeting Cuban defectors.203 A worldwide draft would put 
every domestic and international player on an even playing field. It 
would eliminate the need for defection, and in turn eliminate the 
dangers and crimes related to human trafficking, because there would 
be no financial incentive to obtain residency in a third county before 
coming to the United States. It would also reduce the incentive for 
smugglers, because they would receive only a fraction of the finder’s 
fee (draft salaries are much lower than free agency salaries)204 they 
currently obtain by coordinating defection and residency approval in a 
third country. This change to the MLB rules, as applied, could comply 
with the CACR and the Trump administration’s crackdown of the 
omnibus sanctions, while achieving MLB’s desired goal of eliminating 
human trafficking and providing a safe route for foreigners to play 
baseball in the United States. 
However, a worldwide amateur draft is unlikely to solve the 
problem facing Cuban baseball players and MLB is unlikely to adopt 
this proposal. For one, it would require MLB to repeal the Kuhn 
directive, because the league currently prohibits scouting in Cuba.205 
Additionally, it is not entirely clear if this policy would comply with 
the CACR. In theory, it is still a CACR violation if the Cuban national 
does not denounce his citizenship, is drafted into MLB, and is paid a 
special, taxable salary, even if it is a miniscule salary in comparison to 
a potential free agency deal. Further, the Major League Baseball 
Players Association (“MLBPA”) and various MLB officials, teams, 
and player agents oppose a draft, because it lowers salaries across the 
league and thus gives the owners an advantage in the balance of 
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bargaining power.206 Because of this opposition and uncertainty, a draft 
is unlikely until the sanctions are lifted, or at the very least, 
weakened.207 
B. Use International Free Agency within MLB’s Discretion 
The collective-bargaining agreement between MLB and its 
players already gives the MLB Commissioner discretion to determine 
the residency of a player for purposes of international free agency 
eligibility.208 The commissioner could use that discretion to say that a 
Cuban player who comes directly to the United States will not be 
treated as a resident of the United States for a limited period, perhaps 
one year. This would essentially legalize defection directly to the 
United States, but still promote the open market free agency for Cuban 
players. 
The MLBPA has no reason to object, because salaries for Cuban 
players would be determined on the open market and not through the 
international draft.209 But this solution would not entirely end 
trafficking, and Cuban baseball players would still have to escape from 
Cuba to play in MLB. Furthermore, given the current border crisis and 
crackdown on immigration in the United States,210 there is no guarantee 
that this process would be acceptable to the current administration. 
Despite these drawbacks, allowing players to come directly to the 
United States and sign as free agents would give federal and local law 
enforcement much more power to investigate and prosecute crimes of 
extortion, confinement, and violence against players.211 MLB club 
owners might need to negotiate harder and pay a bit more for players 
in such a free market, but this solution could protect the next generation 
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of Cuban players from trafficking without supporting the Cuban 
government. This option is also available to MLB now, under its own 
rules, and would not be subject to legal restriction or political whim. 
Unfortunately, MLB deputy commissioner and Chief Legal 
Officer Dan Halem has rebuffed this solution. “There’s simply no 
evidence that making that change would prevent human trafficking,” 
says Halem. “In fact, it’s my understanding that it’s actually harder to 
enter the U.S. than many other countries. So, such a rule change may 
result in more sophisticated smuggling of Cuban players to bring them 
directly to the United States.”212 
C. MLB Should Agree to Increased Monitoring through 
Independent Audits 
Because implementation of the aforementioned solutions is highly 
unlikely, MLB must find a way to stay in compliance with the sanctions 
while changing its international signing policies enough to curb human 
trafficking and the international financial criminal violations. In 
response to the proliferation of these crimes, professional leagues and 
their member franchises should closely examine high-risk interactions 
with officials of foreign governments. MLB should remain particularly 
sensitive to interactions that involve third parties acting on behalf of 
the league or one of its teams. MLB should adopt standard operating 
procedures specifically directed at corruption and bribery concerns for 
league and team employees, as well as third parties. MLB should also 
consider establishing a regular training schedule for these employees 
and licensed team agents in order to ensure awareness of league-wide 
anticorruption policies. Additionally, MLB should consider following 
the advice of federal regulators by implementing an effective 
compliance program, which includes due diligence of any prospective 
foreign agents that receive payments, either from the league or one of 
its member teams.213 Teams should consider having their operations 
periodically audited by an independent third party to evaluate FCPA 
and RICO compliance. 
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D. The Trump Administration Should Reinstate the 2018 MLB-FCB 
Agreement 
Perhaps the most obvious recommendation is to simply reinstate 
the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement. The agreement would have allowed 
Cuban baseball players to sign freely with any MLB team, would have 
allowed Cuban players to live in or visit Cuba, and would have 
provided for MLB scouts to travel to Cuba and sign players without the 
need for defection, buscones, or the violation of any international 
law.214 In exchange for this access, the FCB would garnish the wages 
of its former players who sign MLB contracts.215 The garnished funds 
were to be used to stimulate baseball infrastructure in Cuba.216 
Reinstating the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement is likely the most 
comprehensive solution to curb human trafficking while still adhering 
to the goals of the omnibus economic sanctions, but reinstatement is 
highly unlikely. In 2016, MLB received a license from OFAC 
confirming that FCB was not a part of the Cuban government.217 Just 
as OFAC abruptly reversed course when it scuttled the agreement with 
its determination that FCB was actually part of the communist 
government, it could just as quickly re-interpret the FCB’s 
independence along International Olympic guidelines and confirm that 
FCB is once again, not an arm of the communist regime. However, this 
reversal is not likely to occur under the current administration for two 
specific reasons. First, even if MLB were to challenge OFAC’s 
determination that the FCB is part of the Cuban government, judicial 
review of OFAC’s decisions are “highly deferential,” even if the 
decision is “of less than ideal clarity.”218 Second, the Trump 
Administration’s hardline stance against direct financial support to 
Cuba, especially in the context of Cuba’s allegiance to Maduro of 
Venezuela,219 is likely to stonewall any chance of reinstatement of the 
2018 MLB-FCB Agreement. Despite the unlikelihood of reinstatement 
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under the current administration, there are lobbyists putting pressure on 
the Trump administration to consider reinstating the agreement.220 
These groups should continue to promote the merit of the agreement 
and its anti-human trafficking provisions in hopes that a future US 
presidential administration prioritizes the improvement of US-Cuba 
relations through the reinstatement of the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement will not restore democracy in 
Cuba; nor will it end the human rights abuses that take place daily on 
the island. However, normalization of US and Cuba relations through 
baseball diplomacy would represent a small but immensely positive 
step that aligns with the objectives of the Cuba sanctions. Will the 2018 
MLB-FCB Agreement collaterally benefit the Cuban government? 
Potentially. There is no real way of knowing if the FCB is part of the 
central communist government. Is the agreement worthwhile in the 
context of preventing human trafficking and international criminal 
activity? Absolutely. The dollars that potentially flow into Cuba from 
this agreement will have a miniscule impact and will not substantially 
stabilize the communist regime, threaten national security, or harm 
democracy. In fact, there is no risk to national security by allowing 
Cuban baseball players to achieve their dream of playing Major 
League Baseball safely and legally. The value of the 2018 MLB-FCB 
Agreement in curbing human trafficking, FCPA violations, and RICO 
violations far outweighs any stimulus to the Cuban government that 
this agreement potentially provides. Thus, the 2018 MLB-FCB 
Agreement would not violate the original objective of the TWEA and 
the CACR and should be reimplemented with responsible and 
enforceable monitoring requirements. 
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